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I. INTRODUCTION

On July 3,2001, the European Commission (Commission) prohibited
the General Electric Co.'s (GE) proposed forty-two billion dollar
acquisition of Honeywell Inc.' The Commission asserted that the merger
would have severely reduced competition in the aerospace industry by
combining the strong position of GE in aircraft engine markets with the
similarly strong position of Honeywell in avionics and non-avionics
systems? This was the fifteenth time the Commission had blocked a
* M.St (Oxon), LL.B., B.B., Member of Exeter College, The University of Oxford,
England.
1. Commission Decision of July 3,2001, Declaring Concentration to be Incompatible with
the Common Market and the EEA Agreement, Case No. COMP/M.2220 - General
Electric/Honeywell, 2001 O.J. (C 1746) [hereinafter GEIHoneywell Decision]. Following the
blocking of the transaction, both undertakings launched actions against the Commission before the
European Court of First Instance requesting the annulment of the decision of the Commission. At
the date of this writing both actions are still pending. See Case T-209/01, 2001 O.J. (C 331) 39
(Honeywell); Case T-210/01, 2001 O.J. (C 331) 40 (GE).
2. See GE/Honeywell Decision, supra note 1, 567. The Commission concluded that the
remedies proposed by GE were insufficient to resolve the competition concerns resulting from the
proposed acquisition of Honeywell. Id. 566; see also E.U. Institutions Press Releases, The
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merger since September 1990, when the European Merger Regulation took
effect.3 The GE/Honeywell decision adds to a string of high profile
decisions taken by the Commission concerning multinational mergers.
Decisions such as Boeing/McDonnellDouglas,4 together with the blocking
of the MCI WorldCom/Sprint merger,5 the conditional approval of the
AOL/Time Warner merger,6 and the abandoned EMI/Time Warner

Commission Prohibits GE's Acquisition of Honeywell, DN: IP/01/939, July 3, 2001 [hereinafter
Commission Prohibits GE's Acquisition ofHoneywell]; E.U. Institutions Press Releases, Statement
on General Electric/Honeywell Merger, DN: IP/01/842, June 14, 2001.
3. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, art.
25(1) 1990 O.J. (L 257) 13 (EEC) [hereinafter European Merger Regulation].
4. Commission Decision 97/816 of July 30, 1997, Declaring a Concentration Compatible
with the Common Market and the Functioning of the EEA Agreement, Case No. IV/M.877 Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, 1997 O.J. (L 336) 16.
5. On February 21, 2000, the Commission announced an investigation into a proposed
merger between the merged entity MCI WorldCom and Sprint, two American telecommunications
firms, which if completed would have created a firm worth $180 billion. See E.U. Institutions Press
Releases, Commission Opens Full Investigation into the MCI WorldCom/Sprint Merger, DN:
IP/00/174, Feb. 21, 2000 [hereinafter Commission Opens Full Investigation]. On June 28, 2000,
the Commission decided to prohibit the merger between the firms, as it would have resulted in the
creation of a dominant position in the market for top-level, universal intemet connectivity.
Commission Decision of June 28,2000, Declaring a Concentration Incompatible with the Common
Market, Case No. COMP/M. 1741 - MCI WorldCom/Sprint, available at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m 1741_en.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2002). This was
the thirteenth time the Commission had blocked a merger since 1990. E.U. Institutions Press
Releases, Commission Prohibits Merger Between MCI WorldCom and Sprint, DN: IP/00/668, June
28, 2000. At the same time, the U.S. Justice Department also blocked the deal due to its potential
effect on competition. See also Super Mario, ECONOMIST, Feb. 26, 2000.
6. Commission Decision of Oct. 11,2000, Declaring a Concentration to be Compatible with
the Common Market and the EEA Agreement, Case No. COMP/M. 1845 - AOL/Time Warner,
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1845_en.pdf (last
visited Apr. 15, 2002); see also E.U. Institutions Press Releases, Commission Opens Full
Investigation into AOL/Time Warner Merger, DN: IP/00/634, June 19, 2000 (containing an account
of the Commission's investigation of the merger); E.U. Institutions Press Releases, Commission
Gives Conditional Approval to AOL/Time Warner Merger, DN: IP/00/1 145, Oct. 11, 2000. One
of the Commission's primary concerns was AOL's position in the emerging market of on-line,
internet music delivery. Mario Monti, European Competition Policy for the 21 st Century, Speech
at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute's Twenty-Eighth Annual Conference on International
Antitrust Law and Policy (Oct. 20, 2000), in E.U. Institutions Press Releases, DN:
SPEECH/00/389, Oct. 20, 2000. For the U.S. perspective, see generally Press Release, Federal
Trade Commission, Commission Statement on Time Warner/AOL Merger (Nov. 9, 2000),
availableat http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/1 1/timewameraol.htm (last visited Apr. 15,2002); Press
Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Approves AOL/Time Warner Merger with Conditions
(Dec. 14,2000), availableathttp://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/12/aol.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2002);
Alec Klein, US.Agency ChiefPlays Key Role in AOL Deal, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 30, 2000,
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merger,7 had already focused attention on and occasionally sparked
criticism of the Commission's evaluations of cross-border mergers.'
Well aware of possibly building tension between U.S. and E.U.
authorities due to the -Commission's blockage of the GE/Honeywell
merger, Commissioner Mario Monti was quick to point out that:
The European Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice have
worked in close co-operation during this investigation. It is
unfortunate that, in the end, we reached different conclusions, but
each authority has to perform its own assessment .... This does not
mean that one authority is doing a technical analysis and the other
pursuing a political goal, as some might pretend, but simply that we
might interpret facts differently and forecast the effects of an
operation in different ways.9
Commissioner Monti made a major effort to conciliate the undertakings
and officials in the United States by describing the transaction as a rare
case of well-meaning competition authorities coming to different opinions
about the impact of a deal on the global market.'°
The importance of the GE/Honeywell decision lies in the fact that the
Commission's decision contrasted the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ)
conclusion, which had cleared the merger earlier that year, requiring only
minimal disposals. The DOJ's Antitrust Division determined that the
merger, as modified by the remedies insisted upon, would have been procompetitive and beneficial to consumers." The Commission decision

at 1; Stephen Labaton, AOL Deal Clears its Major US. Obstacle, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 15,
2000, at 1.
7. See generallyE.U. Institutions Press Releases, Commission Opens Full Investigation into
Time Warner/EMI Merger, DN: IP/00/617, June 14,2000; Europe'sMergerMorass,ECONOMIST,
Sept. 23, 2000; Time Warner Drops EMI Takeover, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 6, 2000, at 13.
8. For the U.S. media's reaction to the block of the GE/Honeywell transaction, see Steven
Pearlstein, E.U Rejection Shows Divergence of the World's Rules, WASH. POST, July 4, 2001, at
El; Peter Pae, E.U Rejects GE Acquisition of Honeywell, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 2001, at pt. 3, p. 1;
Lester C. Thurow, Irreconcilable Differences, BOSTON GLOBE, July 10, 2001, at D4; R.C.
Longworth, GE-Honeywell's Roadblocks Rare: An ErceptionAmid a Flood of Global Mergers,
CHI. TRIB., July 5, 2001, at 1, Zone N; US. Chorus Gets Louder Over Failed GE Deal: Top
PoliticianSlams E.U. for Blocking Honeywell Sale, NAT'L POST, July 12, 2001, at C 10.
9. Commission Prohibits GE's Acquisition of Honeywell, supra note 2.
10. Daniel Dombey & Andrew Hill, Monti Moves to HealGERift, FIN. TIMES (London), July
4, 2001, at 27; Engine Failure,ECONOMIST, July 7, 2001.
11. See Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Requires Divestitures in
Merger Between General Electric and Honeywell (May 2, 2000), availableat http://www.usdoj.
gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2001/8140.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2002). The DOJ's agreement
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which followed was the first case of the European Union blocking a
merger already approved by U.S. authorities.
The conflicting decisions rendered by two closely co-operating partners
in the GE/Honeywell case highlight the risk and uncertainty undertakings
and regulating authorities must face when operating in the global market.
Specifically, the rulings question whether the current procedures and
cooperative frameworks effectively provide foreseeable outcomes for
undertakings operating in the United States and the European Union to
meet the necessities of the global market.
This Article addresses several of the sounding parameters of
multinational merger control. Initially, it reviews the global progression of
merger control regimes and highlights the way in which the multitude of
jurisdictions affect undertakings. Afterwards, the Article describes the
domestic jurisdiction's perspective in facing the global market and
examines the different incentives that may lead it to cooperate with other
competition jurisdictions. Finally, the Article evaluates the U.S. and E.U.
approaches towards co-operation, while analyzing their ability to address
global happenings.
II.

GLOBALIZATION OF MERGER CONTROL

The effects of globalization have made it clear that economic and
competition policy problems can transcend national boundaries. For the
past forty years, globalization has represented "the economic integration
achieved by the activities ofmultinational enterprises."' 2 These enterprises
are no longer strictly limited by geographical and physical boundaries.
Today, their economic decisions reflect a global perception.
Although globalization processes have strongly influenced national
economies and brought them closer to interdependence, the impact of
globalization has not caused centralization or homogenization in all areas.
In contrast to the alleged increase of homogeneity in trade-related aspects,
other fields of national consideration, such as domestic politics, industrial
policy, and legal frameworks vary in their characteristics, culture, and

with GE and Honeywell resolved its concerns about the merger, as the parties were required to
divest the helicopter engine business and authorize new service providers for engine and auxiliary
power units. See id.
12. Alan Rugman, The Illusion of the Global Company, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 8, 2001,
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scopes. Thus, the deepening structural interdependence of the world
economy did not necessarily lead to a fall in sovereignty. 13
In areas dominated by domestic considerations, states may implement
policies that are liable to contradict global aims. This misfit between
domestic interests and the global perspective may often generate economic
inefficiencies. In particular, this is the case in the highly sensitive area of
international merger control, where domestic interests may be hidden
within the appraisal process, thereby creating a duality capable of
hindering optimal international antitrust regulation.
Today, more than eighty jurisdictions apply a range of antitrust
legislation to various transactions. Legislation in forty of these
jurisdictions was created within the last decade. Approximately sixty
jurisdictions possess specific rules for the control of mergers and
acquisitions, and almost fifty have ex-ante notification mechanisms
requiring undertakings to notify the proper authorities about their merger
transactions in advance. 4 These jurisdictions increased the enforcement
of competition laws throughout the world and contributed to the
maintenance of competitive markets and the protection of consumer
interests. On the other hand, as the number of jurisdictions holding
antitrust regimes has dramatically increased in the last decade, so too has
the intricacy of evaluating mergers. The number of existing antitrust
jurisdictions demonstrates the complexity of approving cross-border
transactions and the possibility of jurisdictional overlap in concentration
assessments. Potentially, this could lead to conflicting decisions, increases
in legal confusion, enlarged costs for undertakings, and reductions in legal
and economic certainty.
III. EFFECTS ON UNDERTAKINGS
On the whole, the multitude of antitrust jurisdictions presently active
in the global arena has enhanced competition and economic growth, and
ensured a wide choice of goods and services to consumers. Nevertheless,
as a byproduct of the numerous sources of national legal regimes,
internationally active entities are now exposed to the effects of overlapping
jurisdictions.
13. The increase in trade homogeneity does not clearly illustrate a true globalized process.
See ALAN RUGMAN, THE END OF GLOBALIZATION 2-4 (2000), for a discussion on the myth of
globalization and the existence of regional trade blocks.
14. 2000 INT'L COMPETITION POL'Y ADVISORY COMM. TO THE ATT'Y GEN. &AsSIST. ATT'Y
GEN. FOR ANTITRUST, FINAL REPORT, annex 2-C, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/2c.
pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2002) [hereinafter ICPAC].
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As the number ofjurisdictions reviewing single transactions increases,
so does the complexity of those processes. This reduces legal and
economic certainty, as more than one approval becomes necessary to
properly clear a deal. The existence of different approaches to the same
transaction also heightens the risks of imposing inconsistent limitations on
the undertakings seeking approval and may undermine their confidence in
the process. In the case of GE/Honeywell, the assessment of one
transaction by two jurisdictions generated uncertainty and lead to
conflicting decisions. However, this was not the first time merging parties
faced contrasting rulings and remedies from different jurisdictions.
Examples may be found in several cases. In the Gencor/Lonrhodecision,'5
the Commission asserted its jurisdiction to block a proposed merger
between the South African platinum interests of Lonrho, a British firm,
and South Africa's Gencor because it would have created a duopoly in the
platinum and rhodium markets.6 The South African Competition Board
had no objections to the transaction, favoring the consolidation on the
grounds that two equally matched competitors were preferable to a single
dominant firm, a situation that already existed in the South African
market. 7 After first relying upon the South African determination, the
undertakings were then forced by the European Union to cancel the
transaction.' 8
In a different case in 1997, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
authorized the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas'9 merger without any
conditions, concluding that Boeing's acquisition would not "substantially
lessen competition." Appraising the same transaction, the Commission
voiced "serious doubts" about the proposed merger's compatibility with

15. Commission Decision of Apr. 24, 1996, Declaring a Concentration to be Incompatible
with the Common Market and Functioning of the EEA Agreement, Case No. IV/M.619 - Gencor/
Lonrho, 1997 O.J. (L 011) 30; see also Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1999 E.C.R. II753.
16. Commission Decision of Apr. 24, 1996- Gencor/Lonrho, 1997 O.J. (LO 1l) 30, 206,
210. The market in question was primarily that of platinum mined in South Africa, although the
geographic market for platinum sales was global. Id. 16.
17. Case T- 102/96, Gencor Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1999 E.C.R. 11-753, 8, 19. The two merging
companies still had to compete with a third South African mining company that was active in the
platinum market. Commission Decision of Apr. 24, 1996-Gencor/Lonhro, 1997 O.J. (L 011) 30,
7 74.
18. Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1999 E.C.R. 11-753, [ 328-29.
19. Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Janet D. Steiger, Roscoe B.
Starek III, and Christine A. Varney, in the Matter of Boeing Co./McDonnell Douglas Corp., July
1, 1997, 1997 WL 359761 (F.T.C.) (File No. 971-0051), availableat http://www.fas.org/MHon
Arc/MSWG_archive/msgOO097.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2002).
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the common market.2" Following a high-profile investigation that attracted
U.S. criticism, the Commission ultimately required the undertakings to
modify their agreement in order to eliminate possible harm to
competition.2 However, the intricacy of operating in the global market
may best be depicted by the Exxon/Mobil decision. Although the two giant
petroleum firms were ultimately allowed to merge, they were forced to
accept the potential that they would have to notify approximately forty
jurisdictions and be subject to their own merger review requirements.22
Evidently, the global arena presents an unpredictable and complex
environment for merging entities, demanding that they be subject to the
laws of multiple jurisdictions. It is not uncommon for a single transaction
to trigger notification processes in several jurisdictions. This external
application of separate domestic competition rules to one transaction may

20. Commission Decision 97/816 of July 30, 1997, Declaring a Concentration Compatible
with the Common Market and the Functioning of the EEA Agreement, Case No. IV/M.877 Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, 1997 O.J. (L 336) 16, 2. The European Commission's concern was
that the merger would drastically reduce competition in the global civil aviation market, as the
merger would reduce the number of large commercial aircraft manufacturers from three to two. See
id. 9 9. As a result, Airbus, the remaining commercial aircraft manufacturer based in Europe and
jointly owned by governmental and private firms, would be left facing a single dominant
competitor. See id. 99 106-08.
21. See id.99113-24. Before the Commission withdrew its objections, the Boeing/McDonnell
Douglas decision raised a debate regarding the Commission's authority to assess and prevent the
merger. Amy Ann Karpel, Comment, The European Commission's Decision on the BoeingMcDonnellDouglasMergerand the Needfor GreaterUS.-E. U Cooperationin the Merger Field,
47 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1029, 1031-32, 1031 n. 12 & 1032 n. 13 (1998). Some critics suggested that
the concerns of the Commission were based purely on its desire to protect Airbus, rejecting the
Commission's claim that its investigation was conducted strictly on the principles of E.U. law. Id.
at 1031-32. The tension between the U.S. and the E.U. authorities increased, leading to the Clinton
administration's announcement that the United States might take the matter to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) if the European Union carried out its threat to declare the merger illegal. Brian
Coleman, Clinton Hints U.S. May Retaliate ifE.U Tries to Block Boeing-McDonnellDeal, WALL
ST. J., July 18, 1997, at A2. See generally Andre Fiebig, The ExtraterritorialApplication of the
European Merger Control Regulation, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 79 (1998/99); Crystal Jones-Starr,
Comment, Community-Wide v. Worldwide Competition: Why EuropeanEnforcementAgenciesare
Able to Force American Companies to Modify Their Merger Proposals and Limit Their
Innovations, 17 WIS. INT'L L.J. 145 (1999); Brussels v. Boeing, ECONOMIST, July 19, 1997, at 53;
Distrustful, ECONOMIST, July 26, 1997, at 60; MARK FURSE, COMPETrTON LAW OF THE UK & EC
306 (2d ed. 2000).
22. See generally Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Exxon/Mobil Agree to Largest
FTC Divestiture Ever in Order to Settle FTC Antitrust Charges: Settlement Requires Extensive
Restructuring and Prevents Merger of Significant Competing U.S. Assets (Nov. 30, 1999),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1999/9911/exxonmobil.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2002)
(describing conditions placed on the approval of the merger between the two firms in the United
States).
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give rise to legal conflicts, incoherence between rulings of foreign
agencies or courts, as well as political contradictions and enforcement
difficulties.23 Undertakings might be required to invest great lengths of
time and resources in the notification process and in the identification of
the jurisdictions they are subject to. Moreover, suspensions of
concentrations, forced by the need to comply with rules in many
jurisdictions, also carry various collateral costs.2 4 Undertakings are often
fined by certain jurisdictions when they fail to notify those jurisdictions'
authorities about the transaction prior to its conclusion. Finally, the
existence of distinct, domestic, economic and political considerations and
different geographical markets make it harder for undertakings to
anticipate each appraisal procedure's results. Failure to predict the
outcomes of these procedures may result in financial25 loss for the
undertakings and a weakening of their competitive ability.
IV.

THE DOMESTIC JURISDICTION'S PERSPECTIVE

As competition becomes increasingly transnational, so may the
restraints on it. Anticompetitive conduct occurring in a given territory
could produce legal consequences not only within that territory, but also
in other jurisdictions. State's attempts to regulate conduct, which they
consider to be a direct concern, have led to the extension of the territorial

23. Mario Monti, Cooperation Between Competition Authorities-A Vision for the Future,
Speech at the Japan Foundation Conference (June 23, 2000), in E.U. Institutions Press Releases,
DN: SPEECH/00/234, June 23, 2000.
24. In the 2001 mid-year report of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), a regular
gathering of corporate leaders from both the United States and the European Union, Michael
Treschow, Chief Executive Officer of Electrolux, Sweden, referred to the merger investigation
procedures as "horrendous," saying that in many cases businesses are essentially frozen for a year
or more awaiting antitrust decisions. Edward Alden, CorporateChiefs Callfor CheaperAntitrust
Process, FIN. TIMES (London), May 17, 2001, at 10. Other voices from the TABD asserted that
delays and uncertainty resulting from antitrust investigations in the United States and the European
Union have been "detrimental to value creation." Id. See generally TRANSATLANTIC Bus.
DIALOGUE, 2001 MID YEAR REP. (May 15, 2001), available at http://www.tabd.com/
recommendations/MYMO I.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2002) (discussing cooperation between U.S.
and E.U. firms).
25. See Engine Failure,supranote 10 (describing the error in judgment made by Jack Welch,
GE's Chairman, who underestimated the risk that regulators might derail the transaction and the
effect regulation would have on both undertakings); Kenneth N. Gilpin, Honeywell Chief Quits
After GEFailure,INT'L HERALDTRIB., July 5,2001, at 10 (describing the effect of such a blockage
on Honeywell and its chairman and chief executive Michael Bonsignore).
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principle ofjurisdiction in some instances, so as to cover conduct abroad.2"
Given the nature of business activities in the last decade, states could not
rely upon purely territorial jurisdiction when aiming to protect local
consumers. In the field of competition law, the assertion of such long-arm
jurisdiction allows states to control anticompetitive activities which may
have been approved in the state where they occurred, but nevertheless
affect competition abroad.
The United States was the first country to fully adopt an extraterritorial
regime of antitrust policies. Cases such as the controversial Aluminum
Company of America," and the later HartfordFire,2" shaped the effects
doctrine and paved the .way for the principle of extraterritoriality.29
Subsequently, the United States has occasionally reviewed and taken
enforcement actions against foreign firm mergers, even when neither of
the firms had production assets within the United States.3"
Other states have also developed antitrust regimes granting them better
control of commercial activities affecting their territory. Included in these
regimes were similar principles of extraterritoriality. 3 Representing the
European Union, the European Court of Justice refrained from directly
adopting the effects doctrine into competition law. In the Wood Pulp
Carteldecision32 the Court defined the implementation of an agreement in
the European Union as the leading criterion for establishing the
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Commission. 3 The execution of an
agreement in the European Union would thus trigger the extraterritorial

26. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 459-60, 468-69 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts
eds., 9th ed. 1992).
27. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
28. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
29. See also Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 615 (9th Cir. 1976)
(listing such relevant considerations, as: effect on foreign commerce of the United States; type and
magnitude of violation; and international comity and fairness); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731
F.2d 909, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding U.S. antitrust law applicable where it would further
interests protected under domestic law).
30. ICPAC, supra note 14, ch. 2.
31. States which were able to successfully enforce their extraterritorial jurisdiction have
gradually expanded theirjurisdictional borders. Examples of extraterritoriality may be found in the
obligation of pre-closing notification of mergers. In many jurisdictions, such a requirement is
triggered by the mere existence of worldwide sales or assets, regardless of where the parties are
located or carry out their business activities. See id. annex 2-A; see also id. annex 2-C, for statistical
information on merger challenge rates and notification obligations in worldwide jurisdictions.
32. Joined Cases 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116-117/85, 125-129/85, Re Wood Pulp Cartel: A
Ahlstrom Oy v. Comm'n, 1988 E.C.R. 5193.
33. Id. 16-17.
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application of European competition laws.3 4 The implementation
requirements, coupled with the criteria delineated in the European Merger
Regulation, also allowed the Commission to assert jurisdiction over the
GE/Honeywell transaction."
States tend to shape their domestic merger enforcement mechanisms to
concentrate on protecting their local markets. Such mechanisms rarely
consider their impact on foreign undertakings and global efficiency. This
is possibly caused by distinct parameters for notifications, timetables,
criteria for asserting jurisdiction over mergers, or different evaluation
procedures. Furthermore, the assessment standards and the goals of
competition policies may differ between individual authorities.36 These
differences exist at the expense of the foreign undertakings, which face
uncertainty and confusion in the approval procedure.
In addition to all of these legitimate divergences, it is possible to
identify aptitudes towards advancing non-competitive goals in the guise
of cross-border merger evaluations. The possible use of antitrust policy as
a governmental tool to achieve goals beyond maintaining competition may
lead to a lack of clarity or consistency. The different interests promoted by
separate national enforcement bodies vary. These interests might include
several goals, such as creating a "national champion," protecting domestic
industry, promoting the development of new local employment
opportunities, or increasing domestic welfare.
When a merger crosses jurisdictions it permits each of the concerned
authorities to advance local considerations and internalize many of the
merger's benefits while ignoring the external costs laid on undertakings
and consumers outside their jurisdictions.37 Competition restraints often
34. Id. In the case of Gencor Ltd. v. Commission, the European Court of First Instance
applied the implementation criterion to the merger, ruling that "the criterion as to the
implementation of an agreement is satisfied by mere sale within the Community." Case T-102/96,
Gencor Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1999 E.C.R. 11-753, 87.
35. European Merger Regulation, supra note 3, art. 1 (setting forth the requirements, under
which the regulation applies to concentrations). The regulation-set thresholds rely on the "combined
aggregate worldwide turnover of all undertakings concerned" and the "aggregate Community-wide
turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned." Id. art. 1(2). Based on these
criteria, the European Merger Regulation applies to undertakings irrespective of their place of
business or registration. This seems to suggest that the Commission has jurisdiction to examine a
concentration even when the merging parties have no actual presence in the European Union.
36. For example, in the GE/Honeywell case, the conflicting decisions can be attributed to the
difference between the European Union's goal of maintaining competition within the industry, and
the U.S. antitrust legislation's focus on how the transaction affects consumers.
37. See David Synder, Note, MergersandAcquisitions in the EuropeanCommunity and the
United States: A Movement Toward a Uniform Enforcement Body, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
115, 135-36 (1997).
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transfer wealth from the consumers to the undertakings, despite reducing
economic efficiency. When embedded in the international scene, such
limitations frequently shift wealth from consumers in one country to
corporations in another.38 A given jurisdiction will strive to shield its local
markets from a negative transfer of wealth, while the jurisdiction that
receives the positive transfer of wealth caused by the anticompetitive
behavior its local corporations will be reluctant to act against such
behavior. Each of them, concentrating on their own economic realities,
will justify their differences in their decisions.39
Returning to the GE/Honeywell case, it is clear that the distribution of
anticompetitive effects may differ in the various countries involved.
Additionally, as a consequence of their domestic, non-competition
considerations, national antitrust authorities may conflict in their
assessments of the proposed merger.
During the Commission's investigation of the GE/Honeywell case,
Commissioner Monti rejected allegations that the Commission politicized
the case, stating that "[t]his is a matter of law and economics, not
politics."4 The Commissioner also stated that "[t]he nationality of the
companies and political considerations have played and will play no role
in the examination of mergers, in this case as in all others." '
Commissioner Monti's statement came as a reply to political pressure
from the United States aimed at persuading the Commission to approve the

38. David J. Gerber, The US.-European Conflict Over the GlobalizationofAntitrust Law:
A Legal Experience Perspective,34 NEw ENG. L. REv. 123, 125 (1999).
39. For instance, the more a country's economy is based on export, the more it may be able
to ignore undesirable effects on competition by absorbing them elsewhere. Net exporters are more
likely to consider the interests of their producers. This is clearly evident in countries which produce
but do not consume. They will tend to favor the interests of their corporations and may under
regulate, from a global perspective, commercial activities. Net importers, who are able to apply
their laws to actions abroad, will tend to over regulate anticompetitive activity in comparison to the
efficient global regulatory level. See Andrew T. Guzman, Is InternationalAntitrustPossible?, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1501, 1504 (1998).
40. E.U. Institutions Press Releases, Commissioner Monti Dismisses Criticism of
GE/Honeywell Merger Review and Rejects Politicization of the Case, DN: IP/01/855, June 18,
2001 [hereinafter Commissioner Monti Dismisses Criticism]. Earlier, Commissioner Monti
dismissed accusations that political considerations were entwined in the European Merger
Regulation, emphasizing that "[wlithin the E.U.'s merger framework there is no scope for the
European Commission to protect European companies from being acquired by U.S. companies or
to promote the commercial aspirations of European companies." Deborah Hargreaves & Peter
Spiegel, Monti Rebuffs US. Attack on Merger Policy, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 19, 2000, at 14.
41. Commissioner Monti Dismisses Criticism, supra note 40.
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transaction. 42 Because the global arena lacks a supreme authority
governing merger assessments and is immune from domestic concerns, it
is difficult to determine if the conflicting decisions were actually results
of differing legal analysis and contrasting economic realities, or whether
the agencies' evaluations were influenced by non-competition factors
entwined with domestic concerns.
Generally, one can expect two opposing possibilities when examining
the international effect of the application of extraterritorial jurisdiction
over mergers. First, domestic jurisdictions may use their extraterritorial
powers to block a merger if they believe it will decrease their domestic
welfare, even though the merger's enhancing effect would increase global
welfare. Similarly, a domestic jurisdiction may also be motivated to
promote local industrial policies in an attempt to boost its welfare relative
to other countries. In this situation, the extraterritoriality of competition
rules serves as the perfect non-diplomatic, undetected platform from which
to advance local economic and industrial considerations under the mask
of legal arguments.
In contrast, the second possibility suggests that the extraterritorial
application of competition law may have balancing merits. This will be the
case when a domestic jurisdiction approves a merger it has deemed
beneficial for its domestic market, but which will severely effect
competition beyond that jurisdiction's borders. In these circumstances,
consumers located outside the domestic jurisdiction would be absorbing
the harmful results. Here, the merger may increase local benefits, but it
simultaneously decreases competition in other markets. Although the
merger should have been forbidden from a global perspective, the
domestic jurisdiction may tend to approve such a transaction. In situations
such as this, extraterritorial applications of competition laws by other
jurisdictions may block the merger, thus advancing global efficiency.43
V. INCENTIVES FOR COOPERATION

The international arena creates new challenges for antitrust authorities.
As more competition problems transcend national boundaries, competition
authorities are driven towards wider cooperation and more effective
42. Populist claims that the Commission was unjustly reaching into other countries' affairs
and asserting authority over foreign transactions which took place under other jurisdictions were
not new. In the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case, the Commission was subject to criticism
regarding its assessment of the merger. See supra text accompanying note 21.
43. Thus, claims that merger reviews are politically influenced may work in both ways,
explaining the approval of the transaction by one authority, as well as its blockage by another.
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enforcement of competition law. Yet, cross-border transactions involving
international entities increase the complexity of concentrations'
assessments and challenge the maintenance of competitive markets.
Therefore, an alliance between the different competition authorities would
facilitate enhanced enforcement of competition law and prevent influential
multinational corporations from distorting trade and harming consumer
welfare.
Overall, the diminishing efficiency of undertakings and domestic
jurisdictions calls for nations to establish a cooperative mechanism. This
is an interaction born not of a shared ideology, but of necessity."
Cooperation allows nations to reduce burdens on their local undertakings,
and ensure the protection of their consumers. Furthermore, such a joint
effort may prevent the overlap of jurisdictions, the possibility of
contrasting decisions, and the potential deterioration of international
economic relations, which can ultimately lead to trade wars.
The fact that separate, unilateral antitrust regimes advocate different
policies influences the motivation of individual jurisdictions to negotiate
a cooperative framework. The ability to further domestic considerations
at the expense of global efficiency questions whether influential
jurisdictions, when implementing extraterritoriality, will be keen to
cooperating with weakerjurisdictions. One factor affecting the willingness
of states to collaborate with each other is their import to export ratio. Other
issues include nations' abilities to externalize their antitrust rules, and the
existence of dissimilar restraints and costs placed on foreign
undertakings.45 The different value each jurisdiction attributes to free trade
and competition concerns may also sway their eagerness to unite forces.
Furthermore, the similarities and interactions between their legal systems
influence the feasibility of concurrence amongst them as well. Finally, the
needs for efficient enforcement policies and information accessibility also
play a key role in persuading nations to work together.
The following model demonstrates incentives for nations to shift from
unilateral extraterritoriality to global cooperation and the creation of an
international, cooperative antitrust agreement. The model assumes that
extraterritorial jurisdiction over corporate activities which take place fully.
or partially outside the assessing jurisdiction creates two distinct

44. Robert Pitofsky, Competition Policy in a Global Economy - Today and Tomorrow,
Remarks at the European Institute's Eighth Annual Transatlantic Seminar on Trade and Investment
(Nov. 4, 1998), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/global.htm (last visited Apr. 15,
2002).
45. This refers to the possibility of ignoring costs placed on external undertakings and the
existence of negative, slip-over influences on the incentive to cooperate.
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outcomes. The first is the domestic market's gain generated from the
maintenance of competition. This value gain is symbolized by the letter
[G]. The second outcome stems from the extraterritorial application of
antitrust law governing undertakings located outside the assessing
jurisdiction and their effects on local markets and general economic
efficiency. These undertakings are subject to the additional costs of
notifying several jurisdictions, the possibility of conflicting decisions, the
harm of legal uncertainty, and the confusion of the multijurisdictional
appraisal process. Where they are not generating greater competitiveness,
these burdens reduce general economic efficiency. Such costs, which are
fully or partially externalized beyond the domestic border, are symbolized
by the letter [C].46 An additional expense from the extraterritorial
application of competition law is absorbed by the appraising jurisdiction
itself and is attributed to the encumbrance of cross-border enforcement, the
mounting tension between the different jurisdictions involved, and the
possibility of retaliation or foreign jurisdictions blocking domestic
transactions. This domestic cost caused by extraterritoriality is symbolized
by the letter [D].
Unilateral extraterritorial applications of antitrust policy typically result
in local gain [G], domestic cost [D], and externalized cost [C]. From a
global perspective, the benefits of extraterritorial application should
outweigh its inefficiencies in order for such assertions ofjurisdiction to be
warrantable. This is most evident in a case where the value of [G] = 0, as
the merger was approved without concessions, even though the merging
parties were required to notify several authorities, most of which were
unaffected by the merger, creating a high value of [C]. Thus a
jurisdiction's unlimited extraterritorial application may result in increases
of [C] and [D], without necessarily adding value at the other end of the
equation, [G].47 Globally, an increase in extraterritorial application can be
justified when [delta] [G] is higher than [delta] [C] + [D].
However, as mentioned above, in the extraterritorial application of
antitrust law, the possibility of ignoring external costs and advancing
domestic considerations may alter the balance from the optimum point and

46. The value is only partially externalized when the undertakings are not located completely
outside the jurisdiction's borders. For example, when country A assesses a transaction between two
corporations located in country B, the value is fully externalized. On the other hand, when country
A assesses a transaction between two corporations, one located in country A and one in country B,
the value is only partly externalized.
47. Note that the externalized cost [C] tends to be greater than the local cost [D], thus
allowing for deeper extraterritoriality as long as [G] + [D] > [C]. However, the increase in the
domestic cost [D] will eventually prevent unlimited extraterritoriality.
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allow extraterritorial evaluations of transactions even when the cost for the
involved undertakings exceeds the domestic market's possible benefits.
The domestic jurisdiction, which concentrates on the local market, might
disregard the externalized cost [C] and focus on the maintenance of local
competition. Thus, the domestic jurisdiction may solely consider its
internal costs and adopt an alternative equation in which as long as [delta]
[G] is higher than the local cost [delta] [D], it will apply its extraterritorial
jurisdiction. Consequently, as long as the local gain from extraterritoriality
exceeds the local costs, including domestic inefficiencies from
extraterritoriality, the domestic jurisdiction will pursue this policy,
ignoring the externalized cost.
Another factor which may affect this equation is the significant expense
of notification fees that several jurisdictions impose on undertakings
planning to merge in what may be considered their jurisdictions. This
could create an incentive for some competition authorities to extend their
jurisdictions in order to catch more transactions under their jurisdictional
umbrella. Although these remote mergers may not have any influence on
domestic competition, domestic jurisdictions may assert their
extraterritorial jurisdiction over them, benefitting from notification fees
while disproportionately burdening undertakings, causing economic
inefficiency, and thus increasing the cost [C]. In this case, the cost [C]
would rise, even though there would be no [G] benefit to legitimize it from
the global perspective.
One may question why a jurisdiction able to pass costs onto other
nations' undertakings and shift general reductions in economic efficiency
elsewhere would be motivated to participate in an international
cooperation agreement to control concentrations. Some of the incentives
to cooperate are mentioned above. These include, inter alia, the more
effective enforcement of competition laws as well as the prevention of
contrasting decisions and the overlapping ofjurisdictions. A cooperation
agreement would also aid countries aiming to eliminate or reduce burdens
on their local undertakings due to foreign competition authorities'
assertions of jurisdiction. Moreover, cooperation would allow states to
shift from a unilateral level of extraterritoriality, to a dual level consisting
of two or more jurisdictions. By interacting with other nations, a country
could limit its extraterritorial application of competition law and remain
relatively assured that neither its domestic interests, nor its expectation of
additional gains from cooperation would be harmed.
As mentioned above, applying unilateral extraterritorial jurisdiction
may urge a country to adopt a balance point of [delta] [G] > [delta] [D],
thus ignoring the value [C], which is absorbed by other nations'
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undertakings, and adopting a sub-optimal standpoint. 4 Assuming that two
countries have comparable import and export activities, as well as similar
merger control regulations and fairly equal costs and gains from their
unilateral extraterritoriality, both can be described by the same basic
equation: [delta] [G] > [delta] [D].
Formerly [delta] [C] was disregarded by both jurisdictions due to their
abilities to externalize its costs. Nevertheless, in a two state dimension,
although both states are able to externalize the value [delta] [C], each state
would absorb the other's externalized value [delta] [C]s ' te ". As a result,
neither country would be able to fully benefit from the externalization of
the cost [C], as it would be absorbed parallel to the other state's
externalized costs. Thus, in a bilateral arena, both jurisdictions are exposed
to additional costs:
State I:

[delta]

[D]state

+ [delta] [C] Externalized by

State II
State II: [delta] [D]S"tel + [delta] [C] Externalized by
State I
In this situation, when the externalized value [C]s t = [C]ste ",neither
jurisdiction will benefit from their theoretical ability to ignore the
externalized costs because each one would absorb the externalized costs
of the other. As a result, both countries would be motivated to lower the
value [C], and may consequently consider cooperation in order to
eliminate as many added costs as possible. Interaction would also permit
each jurisdiction to reduce its domestic cost [D]. In such a cooperative
framework, added expenses from excessive scrutiny, unnecessary
notifications, and the loss of legal certainty can be lessened to a minimum.
Increased collaboration would provide easier enforcement, better access
to information, and improved coordination between authorities.
Furthermore, cooperation would also cut the risk of tension between
authorities created by lack of communication and conflicting decisions.
Both states would therefore agree to reciprocally eliminate as many of the
costs laid on the other as possible.
The economic power of a country, its import/export ratio, and its legal
system including extraterritorial jurisdiction, prior notification,
suspension, and fines - determine the volume of its externalized value
[C]. Thus, countries with similar legal systems and volumes of trade may

48. From a global perspective, [delta] [G] should be higher than [delta] [C] + [D to justify
extraterritoriality.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol14/iss3/2

16

Ezrachi: GlobalizationGLOBALIZATION
of Merger Control—A
at Bilateral Cooperation T
OF MERGER Look
CONTROL

share similar values. In turn, nations which absorb and externalize virtually
equal [C] values may be potential candidates for cooperation agreements.
At the same time, their potential domestic costs [D] would tend to be
comparable. In this respect, relations between the United States and the
European Union present a good example, as both maintain substantial
import and export volumes, have similar legal principles, and theoretically,
share similar values.4 9 In contrast, a country with the ability to externalize
the value [C] to another country's undertakings may have few incentives
to cooperate with the latter country if the latter country lacks the ability to
externalize equal values. In this situation, the strong externalizing country
has little to gain from a cooperation agreement and may drift towards a
unilateral model. Therefore, it can be generally assumed that when
[c]Extenalizd by State I > [C]Extemalized by State !1, State (I) would lack a motive to
cooperate, while State (II) would favor such interaction. State (II) will seek
collaboration because that would allow the state to decrease the negative
effects that were being externalized onto it. It should be emphasized that
this example assumes the existence of a closed cooperation agreement not
addressing additional, related topics. In a wider multi-topic agreement, the
ability to allow transfers of value between the cooperating parties would
exist. Thus, although one jurisdiction might not find it beneficial to
cooperate on antitrust issues, the other may favor a wider cooperation
framework including additional matters to increase its gains from the
interaction.
Diversity in trade volumes, import/export ratios, and abilities to
externalize jurisdictions may explain differences in the willingness to
negotiate cooperation. Other factors, which affect the feasibility of
agreement, tend to be highly unpredictable. These include political and
49. The twojurisdictions share comparable legal systems, extraterritorial applications of their
antitrust laws, high volumes of trade, similarities in their export/import ratios, and extensive
economic links. These factors make cooperation a mutual goal, beneficial for both jurisdictions.
For instance, in 1999, the European Union was the world's leading exporter of merchandise with
a world-share of 18.8%, while the United States was second, holding a world-share of 16.4%; the
United States was the world's largest importer of merchandise with a world-share of 23.6/o,
followed by the European Union with a world-share of 18.8%. See World Trade Organization,
World Trade in 1999 - Overview, Tbl. 1.6, availableat http://www.wto.org. (last visited July 24,
2002). In 1999, the United States exported $152 billion of merchandise to the European Union
(21.9% of all U.S. exports for that year) and imported $201.1 billion of merchandise from the
European Union (19% of all the U.S. imports for that year). See id. Tbl. Ill. 15. Other major trading
partners with the United States in 1999 were Canada (23.7% of all U.S. exports and 19% of its
imports), Mexico (12.6% and 12.7%, respectively), Japan (8.3% and 10.5%, respectively), Korea,
and China (with smaller percentages). See id.The European Union's major trading partners in 1999
were the United States, Japan, China, Switzerland, and Norway (excluding E.U. member states).
See id.
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industrial parameters, as well as interest groups' and bureaucrats'
individual aims and fears. Domestic politics, economic considerations,
employment opportunities, political strength, and stability are only several
of the additional issues that influence the incentives for cooperation and
may sometimes taint states' willingness to negotiate. In addition, unless
regularly affected by the extraterritoriality of other nations, some nations
may be suspicious of the true benefits obtained from cooperation.
From a different perspective, the benefits of cooperation may also bring
nations with strong extraterritoriality to negotiate with weaker partners, if
the stronger nations require such interaction because of technical
constraints, potential political gains, or the desire for control. The fact that
extraterritoriality cannot efficiently control remote activities on a daily
basis may weaken these powerful nations' position in comparison to the
model, consequently moving them towards cooperation. Specifically, this
may be the case when powerful nations use negotiations to influence
weaker nations' markets and increase their dependence, or when stronger
nations are forced to rely on other nations' cooperation in order to
effectively enforce their competition laws.
The theoretical model, and its fluctuation due to the different legal
systems and trade patterns described above, permits key observations of
the approaches that nations take towards interaction and the feasibility of
cooperation or harmonization between those different jurisdictions. First,
the existence of extraterritorial jurisdiction plays a significant role in the
ability and willingness of a state to cooperate with other nations and
protect its local market.
Second, countries with similar economic strengths, equal trade
volumes, comparable legal systems, and reciprocal trading, will share
incentives for cooperation. A powerful jurisdiction will theoretically
refrain from interacting with weaker jurisdictions, as such collaboration
would revoke the benefits otherwise obtained from unilateral
extraterritoriality and require the investment of resources in a seldom-used
mechanism. These powerful jurisdictions may view such cooperation as
a waste of resources, particularly when competition related agreements
would only necessitate cooperation in one or two cases a year. However,
if such an alliance were to allow the stronger nation to pursue other
objectives, such as political gain, that nation might cooperate nevertheless.
Third, a weaker jurisdiction unable to apply its laws extraterritorially
would theoretically have several incentives to cooperation with its strong
trading partners. One primary motive for a weaker jurisdiction to enter a
cooperation agreement would be the ability to reduce the burden of
inefficiency caused by other nations' excessive extraterritorialities.
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Finally, the model may explain the difficulty in creating a multinational
forum for merger control. Such a forum would not allow jurisdictions to
retain benefits otherwise achieved through carefully constructed bilateral
relations. This may increase costs for stronger jurisdictions, as they would
be required to invest resources into cooperative efforts with nations that
they would not normally interact with. Furthermore, the stronger
jurisdictions would not be able to continue unilaterally applying their
competition laws upon other jurisdictions.
VI.

THE U.S. AND E.U. APPROACHES TOWARDS
CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION

A brief review of U.S. and E.U. approaches towards cooperation and
harmonization may be useful before examining the cooperation
agreements between them.
The European Union has traditionally taken a harmonization-oriented
approach towards cross-border competition. This played an important role
in establishing the European Common Market and was used to prevent the
creation of private economic barriers. Historically, the European Union
has pushed for the harmonization of competition law beyond its Member
States. The roots of its current approach towards global cooperation in the
field of competition law may be traced back to the "wise man" group.5 °
Nominated by Commissioner Karel Van Miert, the group was given a
mandate to suggest possible means for strengthening international rules
and cooperation.5 Based on the "wise man" group's report, the European
Union adopted its current "twin-pack approach."52 On one hand, the

50. See generally Competition Policy in the New Trade Order: Strengthening International
Cooperation and Rules: Report of the Group of Experts, COM(95)0359 - C4-0352/95, July 3,
1995.
51. According to the E.U. perspective, international competition rules should be based on
principles of non-discrimination and transparency and should relate to the areas of merger control,
cartels, and abuses of dominant positions. Due to the complementary relationship between trade
and competition policy, the WTO has been identified as the most appropriate forum to host these
efforts. The advantages of the WTO include its broad membership and its ability to enforce binding
rules upon its member states. See generally European Commission Press Release, Commission
Proposes Building World Competition Instrument, DN: IP(96)523 (June 18, 1996); Communication
Submitted by Sir Leon Brittan & Karel Van Miert: Towards an International Framework of
Competition Rules, COM(96)284 final; European Parliament, Resolution on the XXVth Report by
the Commission on Competition Policy - 1995 (COM(96)0126- C4-0240/96), 1996 O.J. (C 362)
0135.
52. Monti, supra note 23.
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European Union leans towards intensifying bilateral cooperation between
competition agencies. The European Union has therefore engaged in both
cooperation agreements, and when those were found insufficient, limited
extraterritorial enforcement of its competition laws. On the other hand,
realizing that bilateral agreements are not vehicles for conflict resolution,
the Commission advocated the creation of a multinational cooperation
framework to ensure convergence and coordination between the vast
number of competition enforcement systems around the world. 3
The U.S. approach differs from the E.U. perspective, viewing attempts
to establish a multinational forum for competition matters with
skepticism.5 4 The United States regards the current bilateral framework as
extremely important and considers the extensive harmonization of
competition laws and the implementation of an international antitrust code
premature, unnecessary, and unrealistic in the short term." The current
U.S. tendency towards bilateral cooperation replaces its former approach,
which pursued a unilateral competition regime. Initially, the United States
embarked on a fifty-year strategy premised mainly on the extraterritorial
application of its antitrust laws.56 Following this, and due to the limits of
aggressive unilateral enforcement, the United States advocated a
complementary system of international interaction in the enforcement of
national antitrust laws. 7 Today, the U.S. approach includes the
encouragement of vigorous antitrust law enforcement on domestic
unilateral bases, the deepening of bilateral agreements, and the creation of
next generation agreements which would allow greater information
exchange between competition agencies.58 There are also indications that
the United States is willing to take a more positive and active stance
towards multinational cooperation. In a 2000 report, the International
Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC) highlighted the
significance of establishing greater cooperation in competition policy and

53. Monti, supra note 6.
54. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 44.
55. See generally Diane P. Wood, Is Cooperation Possible?, 34 NEw ENG. L. REV. 104
(1999); Diane P. Wood, The InternalizationofAntitrust Law: Optionsfor the Future, 44 DEPAuL
L. REV. 1289 (1995); Diane P. Wood, A CooperativeFrameworkforNationalRegulators,72 CHI.KENT L. REV. 521 (1996).
56. See generally William S. Dodge, Extraterritorialityand Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An
Argument for Judicial Unilateralism,39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 101 (1998).
57. See Spencer W. Waller, National Laws and International Markets: Strategies of

Cooperationand Harmonizationin the Enforcement of Competition Law, 18 CARDOZO L. REV.
1111, 1111 (1996).
58. See Spencer W. Waller, The InternalizationofAntitrust Enforcement,B.U. L. REV., 343,
344 (1997).
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merger control.59 The ICPAC report called for the production of an
independent, global competition initiative to foster dialogue directed
towards a greater convergence of competition law and analysis.6"
Between themselves, the United States and the European Union have
engaged in two bilateral cooperative agreements: first, the 1991
Competition Agreement,6 and second, the 1998 Positive Comity
Agreement.6 2 The 1991 U.S.-E.U. Competition Agreement has been one
of the most frequently enforced treaties. This is due mainly to the level of
commercial activity crossing the Atlantic Ocean. Based on the recognition
that the economies of the world, particularly those ofthe United States and
the European Union, were becoming increasingly interrelated, the United
States and the European Union signed the 1991 Competition Agreement
as a means to promote cooperation and coordination, and lessen the
possibility of negative impacts from differences in their applications of
their competition laws. At the time of signing, the parties were facing a
growth in transatlantic transactions and wished to ensure a more effective
and efficient application of their competition rules.63 The signing of the
Agreement also symbolized both parties' understanding of the
interdependence of global economics and the need for mutual respect for
each other's significant interests. The 1991 Competition Agreement thus
set as its objective the promotion of a better coordination of competition
policy and actions.' The 1998 Positive Comity Agreement reinforced the
1991 Competition Agreement. However, mergers were not within the
scope of the 1998 Agreement, since U.S. and E.U. merger legislation,

59. ICPAC, supra note 14, ch. 1.
60. This initiative at the multinational level reflects a U.S. shift from focusing solely on
bilateral relations to a wider perspective. Such a move is aimed to increase convergence, but it is
not a U.S. push for a global harmonized framework.
61. Agreement Between the United States and the European Communities on the Application
of Their Competitive Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, U.S.-E.C., 30 I.L.M. 1487 (1991).
62. Agreement Between the United States and the European Communities on the Application
of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of their Competition Laws, June 4, 1998, U.S.E.C., 1998 U.S.T. LEXIS 72, 1998 O.J. (L 173) 28.
63. France questioned the validity of the 1991 Competition Agreement in the European Court
of Justice (ECJ) on the basis of Article 228 of the E.C. Treaty. The ECJ voided the Agreement
while taking the opinion that the Commission had exceeded its powers and that the European
Council should have been the body to conclude the Agreement. Case 327/91, French Republic v.
Comm'n, 1994 E.C.R. 3641. The Agreement was finally approved on behalf of the European
Community on April 10, 1995 and was to apply with effect from September 23, 1991.
64. See Karel Van Miert, Globalizationof Competition: The Need for Global Governance,
availableathttp://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp1 998_052_en.html (lastvisited
Aug. 12, 2002).
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including their strict timetables for merger review, did not permit deferrals
or suspensions of action as envisaged by the Agreement.
Although the cooperation between the United States and the European
Union does not avoid the possibility of conflicting views, as the parties
retain independent analysis and decision making rights, both parties
consider it positive. The Agreements have undoubtedly proven their worth
as vehicles for sharing views on policy development and interaction on
individual cases, and "contribute[d] to improving the effectiveness and
efficiency of the parties' competition laws and reducing the risk of
divergent decisions."65 Both Agreements have also led to a much closer
relationship between the U.S. and E.U. authorities and to a greater
understanding of each other's competition policy." Commissioner Monti
referred to them as "notable success[es]," in his description of the daily
contact between the competition agencies.67 Moreover, he emphasized
their contribution to lowering the risk of conflicting or inconsistent rulings
by the agencies.6"
U.S.-E.U. cooperation is relevant in the field of merger control as well.
Today, virtually any sizeable transaction involving international businesses
is likely to be subject to review in the United States and by the European
Merger Regulation.69 The 1991 Competition Agreement allows a close
relationship between the Commission, the FTC, and the DOJ.7 ° This
communication between the jurisdictions substantially decreases the
possibility of conflicting merger decisions and facilitates more efficient

65. Id.
66. See Jean-Francois Pons,International Co-operation in Competition Matters-Where Are
We Four Years After the Van Miert Report?, Speech before the European Commission (July 9,
1999), availableathttp://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/spl 999 015 en.html (last
visited Aug. 12, 2002).
67. Monti, supra note 6.
68. Id.
69. See Charles S. Stark, Chief of Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division of U.S.
Department of Justice, Improving BilateralAntitrust Cooperation,Speech at the Conference on
Competition Policy in the Global Trading System: Perspectives from Japan, the United States and
the European Union (June 23, 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/
5075.pdf (last visited July 25, 2002).
70. This includes a close daily contact between case teams in the Commission, the FTC, and
the DOJ, which is conducted to acquire knowledge of the substantive and procedural rules in each
other's jurisdiction, substantial convergence in competition analysis, and joint movements towards
best practices in both substantive and procedural matters. See Report from the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament on the Application of the Agreement Between the European
Communities and the Government of the United States of America Regarding the Application of
their Competition Laws, Jan. 1, 1999 - Dec. 31, 1999, COM (2000) 618 final [hereinafter E.C.
Report of 1999].
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concentration appraisals in most cases. 71U.S.-E.U. merger cooperation has
been characterized by a marked, progressive convergence in the agencies'
thinking with regards to the definition of markets, the assessments of
proposed operations' likely competitive effects on the relevant markets,
and the appropriateness of remedies proposed by the parties to relieve the
competition concerns identified by the authorities.72
The Commission has recently published the Green Paper,suggesting
amendments to the European Merger Regulation." The Green Paper
further supports the process of convergence between the United States and
European Union and may help intensify it. Among other issues, the Green
Paperalso evaluates the possibility of introducing greater flexibility to the
definition of the triggering event which would require notification.74
Furthermore, an amendment to the timetable for the settlement process and
the stop-the-clock provisions is analyzed. As proposed, that amendment
would allow undertakings to request additional time to negotiate
commitments and modifications to the transaction. Moreover, the Green
Paperengages in a discussion on substantive tests for merger appraisals,

71. Today, the depth of cooperation between the United States and European Union depends
primarily on the merging parties' consent to waive confidentiality and permit the agencies to share
information.
72. See E.C. Report of 1999, supra note 70.
73. Green Paperon the Review of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89, COM (2001) 745
final.
74. Such modification would allow undertakings to notify the Commission and the U.S.
agencies of a transaction simultaneously. In order to achieve a similar flexibility, parties may
presently submit an informal notification to the Commission parallel to a formal notification to the
U.S. agencies. Cf id. 1 184.
75. Currently, the Commission operates under a strict timetable to conclude its merger
investigations. European Merger Regulation, supra note 3, art. 10; see also supra text
accompanying note 3. Concerning the GE/Honeywell merger, the proposed modifications would
have allowed GE more time to discuss modified commitments to solve the concerns raised by the
Commission. During the case, GE proposed a number of commitments on June 14, 2001, which
was the legal deadline for submission of remedies. The Commission considered these remedies
insufficient to resolve the competition concerns it had identified. On June 28, 2001, beyond the
deadline for submission of remedies, GE proposed a new set of remedies. This offer did not meet
conditions set by the Commission's Notice on Remedies Acceptable under Council Regulation
(EEC) No. 4064/89 and under Commission Regulation (Z-C) No. 447/98, 2001 O.J. (C 680) 3, 311. According to this Notice, the Commission could only accept modified commitments when they
solved the competition concerns in a clear and straightforward manner without the need for a
further market test. However, had more time been available to GE for submitting its commitments
as proposed under the Green Paper,it may have been able to initially suggest modifications that
would have been considered sufficient to resolve the competition concerns the Commission
identified. See generally Dimitri Giotakos et al., GeneralElectric/Honeywell-An Insight Into the
Commission's Investigation and Decision, 3 COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSL. 5 (2001).
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considering the merits of the "dominance test" as laid down in the
European Merger Regulation and of the "significant lessening of
competition test," used in other jurisdictions and the United States. These
proposals and recommendations on both technical and substantive levels
are likely to bring closer the merger procedures undertaken in the United
States and the European Union.
Practical cooperation between the United States and the European
Union is evident on a case-by-case basis, as the sharp increase in
communications between the United States and the European Union
during the last merger wave demonstrates.76 In the Exxon/Mobile merger,
informal contacts between the FTC and the Commission started soon after
the announcement of the transaction, a few months before the formal
notification occurred in May 1999. Following the notification and after
obtaining waivers from the merging parties which allowed the exchange
of confidential information between the authorities, the agencies closely
cooperated in assessing much of the case's substance.77 The MCI
WorldCom/Sprint merger also serves as a good example because it created
an unprecedented level of cooperation between Washington and Brussels.78
And the AOL/Time Warner merger is another very recent illustration of
effective cooperation between the U.S. and E.U. enforcement agencies.7 9
In light of the increase in large scale cross-border transactions, the
United States and the European Union took steps to improve their
cooperation. In October 1999, at the annual bilateral meeting between the
Commission, the FTC, and the DOJ; a joint U.S.-E.U. Merger Working
Group was established. The group's aim was to enhance transatlantic
cooperation in the control of global mergers. The group was mandated to
study the respective U.S. and E.U. approaches to identification and
implementation of remedies and to post-merger remedy compliance
monitoring. The group was also chartered to focus on the scope of further
convergence of U.S. and E.U. analysis and methodology in merger cases,
specifically concentrating on their treatment of oligopolies and collective
dominance/coordination interactions.

76. Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the
Application of the Agreements Between the European Communities and the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of Canada Regarding the Application of Their
Competition Laws, Jan. 1, 2000 - Dec. 31, 2000, COM (2002) 45 final, §§ 1.2, 1.4.
77. E.C. Report of 1999, supra note 70.
78. See Commission Opens Full Investigation, supra note 5.
79. See supra note 6.
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Addressing cooperation between the United States and the European
Union in the field of merger control, then FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky
observed:
It is hard to imagine how day-to-day cooperation and coordination
between enforcement officials in Europe and the United States
could be much improved. Within the bounds of confidentiality
rules, we share, on a regular and continuing basis, views and
information about particular transactions, coordinate the timing of
our review process to the extent feasible, and almost always achieve
consistent remedies. 80
Referring to the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case, which sparked much
attention and criticism from both sides of the Atlantic, Chairman Pitofsky
viewed it as "a little blip in a constant stream of cases."'"
Should the conflicting GE/Honeywell decisions be viewed similarly?
Commenting on the Commission's GE/Honeywell decision, Charles A.
James, Assistant Attorney General for the U.S. DOJ Antitrust Division,
issued a statement backing the DOJ decision, stating that clear and
longstanding U.S. antitrust policy holds that antitrust laws protect
competition, not competitors,82 thus implying that the E.U. decision
reflected a significant point of divergence. However, he concluded by
emphasizing the close cooperative relations between the United States and
the European Union. "In fact, there were extensive consultations in this
matter throughout the entire process. This matter points to the continuing
need for consultation to move toward greater policy convergence. 8 3
When focusing on the similarities between the United States and the
European Union, and their past record of cooperation and coordination, the
GE/Honeywell decision may be viewed as a unique transaction which
triggered a rare difference in competition analyses. The United States

80. Robert Pitofsky, E.U. and U.S. Approaches to International Mergers - View from the
U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Speech before the European Commission Merger Control Tenth
Anniversary Conference, (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/pitinter
mergers.htm (last visited July 23, 2002).
81. An Interview with Bob Pitofsky, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV., Dec. 1997/Jan. 1998,
at 26, 27.
82. Press Release, Department of Justice, Statement by Charles A. James, Assistant Attorney
General on the E.U.'s Decision Regarding the GE/Honeywell Acquisition (July 3, 2001)
[hereinafter Statement by Charles A. James], available at www.usdoj.gov/atrpublic/press..
releases/2001/85 I0.htm (last visited July 23, 2002).
83. Id.; see also Peter Spiegel, U.S. Callsfor More Antitrust Agreement with Europe, FIN.
TIMES (London), Oct. 26, 2001, at 11.
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considered short-term efficiencies and the expected positive effects on
consumers." In contrast, the Commission relied on the portfolio vertical
foreclosure theory, and raised doubts about the transaction's positive
effects. The Commission's main concern was that in the long-term, the
post-merger price reductions would force competitors to exit the industry,
eventually leading prices to rise above pre-merger levels.8 5 Adding to the
analytical difference may have been the fact that when the Commission
reviewed the transaction, it took into consideration GE/Honeywell's U.S.
competitors' arguments, which had not been heard in the same magnitude
when the DOJ reviewed and approved the transaction earlier. Conflicts
may have also stemmed from customers' oppositions to the merger, which
could be aired in privacy and anonymity under E.U. regulations - in
contrast to the United States' public proceedings, which may have deterred
customers from openly opposing the transaction.86 As each authority
preformed its own assessment, the risk of dissenting views, although
regrettable, could never be totally excluded.
As stated by Commissioner Monti, the existence of conflicting results
when assessing the same transaction "does not mean that one authority is
doing a technical analysis and the other pursuing a political goal, as some
might pretend, but simply that we might interpret facts differently and
forecast the effects of an operation in different ways."8" Such different
opinions have been very rare, but when they do occur, the two jurisdictions
"must learn to manage at the technical level and avoid such decisions
becoming a political dispute." 8
Oyerall, bilateral cooperation cannot eliminate differences, nor can it
dispel the possibility of conflicting decisions, as parties retaining their
84. The United States based its decision on findings "confirmed by customers worldwide,
that the combined firm could offer better products and services at more attractive prices than either
firm could offer individually." Statement by Charles A. James, supra note 82. See also Press
Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Chairman Muris Stresses Commitments to Cooperation
with European Commission (Nov. 14,2001), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/opa/200 1/11/euus.htm
(last visited July 23, 2002); John R. Wilke, US. Antitrust ChiefCriticizes E.U Decision to Reject
Merger ofGE and Honeywell, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2001, at A3; see generally Helen Power, Euro
Sceptics, LAW., July 23, 2001, at 23.
85. It is especially interesting to examine the Commission's decision while referring to the
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development's report on the portfolio effect, which
stated the conditions under which the negative effects of a conglomerate merger would materialize.
COMPETITION COMMITTEE REP., ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, DAFFE/COMP PORTFOLIO EFFECT IN CONGLOMERATE MERGERS 5 (2002).
86. Power, supra note 84, at 26.
87. Commission Prohibits GE's Acquisition of Honeywell, supra note 2.
88. Avionics: E. U Committee Backs Commission Over GE-Honeywell Decision, Eur. Rep.
(Eur. Info. Service) § 2604 (June 27, 2001).
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independent appraisals are subject to different legal systems. Thus, the
GE/Honeywell decision should be viewed, like the Boeing/McDonnell
Douglas decision, as a split from an otherwise healthy cooperation. But,
such diversions will become less common, as convergence in competition
law and practice between the United States and the European Union
continues to intensify.89
VII. CONCLUSION

The United States and the European Union have managed to develop
a cooperative framework which decreases the possibility for divergences,
as in the GE/Honeywell decision. Although there are jurisprudential
differences between the U.S. and E.U. merger legislations, their close
engagement in assessment and analysis of the same transactions and their
impact on competition has led to similar conclusions in the majority of
cases.90 Thus, the reality of U.S.-E.U. merger cooperation provides
relatively high certainty for undertakings and close interaction for
authorities. However, it cannot eliminate the possibility of future
conflicting decisions.
As seen in the model above, cooperation between differentjurisdictions
is not easily achieved. The U.S.-E.U. relations are some of the most
successfully implemented interactions in the area of antitrust law. The
importance of U.S.-E.U. collaboration increases in proportion to the
amount of trade between the two countries. But as highlighted in the
model, the incentives motivating the United States and the European
Union are not always so attractive to other jurisdictions. Different trade
patterns and legal systems may diminish the incentives to cooperate.
Moreover, low levels of trade between two jurisdictions decrease the
benefits of cooperation for both the countries and the undertakings.
Cooperative efforts should therefore concentrate not on the creation of
endless bilateral connections, but on strengthening valuable links between
close trading partners. As to this issue and the E.U. approach towards
bilateral agreements, Jean-Francois Pons, Deputy Director-General of the
European Commission said:

89. See generallyMario Monti, Antitrust in the U.S. and Europe: A History of Convergence,
Conclusion, Speech before the General Council Roundtable ofthe American Bar Association (Nov.
14,2001), availableathttp://www.eurunion.org/news/speeches/2001/011114mm.htim (last visited
July 23, 2002).
90. See Stark, supra note 69.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

27

424

Florida Journal FLORIDA
of International
Law,
Vol. 14, Iss.LAW
3 [2002], Art. 2
JOURNAL OF
INTERNA77ONAL

[Vol. 14

While we have considered going further and concluding
further bilateral agreements, we are not inclined to do so
where it would be a waste of scarce resources, particularly for
countries with whom we would only co-operate concerning
one or9two cases a year. A priority in this regard is certainly
Japan. '
Regarding the creation of bilateral agreements, it seems that more
importance should be attributed to the quality of bilateral relations. Any
agreement achieved between two close trading parties will do little to
assist if it does not establish greater transparency and de-facto
convergence. In this respect, the U.S.-E.U. cooperation has undoubtedly
reached a relatively high level of concurrence, which manages, to a certain
degree, to bridge their existing legal differences. When studying the global
arena, it is evident that more should be done to increase unity in merger
control. The existing bilateral agreements only partially reduce the
inefficiencies stemming from the overlapping of jurisdictions.
Therefore, a multinational effort should supplement current merger
control. However, as the model illustrates, a multi-participant agreement
is not easily obtained because a multitude of participants would reduce
each individual participant's ability to retain benefits from its select
bilateral agreements. In addition, when a multinational framework includes
a harmonization process, it limits domestic sovereignty, further decreasing
its appeal to certain jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the benefits of such an
agreement would justify the efforts. Multinational harmonization, even at
a partial and technical level, would assist in eliminating inefficient
outcomes such as multiple notifications, lengthy suspensions, overlapping
ofjurisdictions, and the possibility of conflicting decisions. Harmonization
would also increase similarities between competition goals and evaluation
methods. Furthermore, such a framework could eliminate the potential of
industrial, political, or other domestic considerations interfering with the
appraisal process. These efficiencies are still likely to be generated even
if only a small circle of economically strong jurisdictions were to
participate in the harmonization efforts. The creation of such an initially
limited forum might reduce the stronger jurisdictions' reluctance to
include weaker jurisdictions in the framework.92 Although the creation of
a global or regional, harmonized or partially harmonized system to control

91. Pons, supra note 66.
92. For an explanation of the reasoning behind this reluctance, see conclusions of the model
in Part V of this Article.
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multinational mergers and acquisitions is difficult to achieve, it is a worthy
goal, necessitated by the growth of international trade.93

93. This Article does not directly address the current frameworks for multinational
cooperation and harmonization. For reading regarding such efforts, see Waller, supra note 58, at
S1111; Friedl Weiss, From World Trade Law to World Competition Law, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
250 (2000); articles cited supranote 55; ICPAC, supranote 14; TRANSATLANTIC Bus. DIALOGUE,
supra note 24.
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